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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Patrick Martin appeals from the district court's order denying his
I.C.R. 35(c) motion in which Martin alleged the Idaho Department of Correction
miscalculated his parole eligibility date by failing to give him credit for time served
on both of his consecutive sentences.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On June 1, 2010, the district court entered Judgment upon jury verdicts
finding Martin guilty of felony driving under the influence and felony leaving the
scene of an accident. (#37890 R. 1 , Vol. II, pp.469-472; R., pp.31-34.) The court
imposed a unified 10-year sentence with six years fixed for the driving under the
influence charge and a consecutive five-year sentence with one year fixed for
leaving the scene of an accident "for a total unified sentence of seven (7) years
fixed and eight (8) years indeterminate with credit for 481 days served against
the fixed portion of each sentence[.]" (#37890 R., Vol. 11, pp.470-471; R., pp.3233.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (#37890 R., Vol. II, p.471; R., p.33.)
Two weeks later, the court entered a "Sentence Clarification," stating:
The Department of Correction has asked for clarification of
the Defendant's sentence imposed on June 1, 2010.
The
Defendant's sentence is a unified sentence of seven years fixed
and eight years indeterminate. On Count I, the Defendant's
sentence is for ten years, with six years fixed and four years
indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the

Pursuant to the Court's order, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts
from Martin's prior appeal in Docket No. 37890 have been augmented to the
record in this case. (Amended Order Augmenting Appeal, dated June 26, 2015
(emphasis original).)
1
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fixed portion of the sentence. On Count II, the Defendant's
sentence is for five years, with one year fixed and four years
indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the
fixed portion of the sentence. Thus on Count II, all the fixed time
has been served and only indeterminate time remains to be served.
The sentences are consecutive.
(R., p.24.)

At the end of the retained jurisdiction period, the court placed Martin on
probation.

(See R., p.3 (entry dated 11/10/2010).) Approximately 18 months

later, the state filed a motion for probation violation. (See R., p.5 (entry dated
05/24/2012).) Martin admitted violating his probation and, on August 6, 2012, the
district court revoked Martin's probation and ordered his sentence executed.
(#37890, Order Revoking Probation and Judgment of Conviction and Order of
Commitment, dated August 6, 2012 ("2012 Order") (augmentation).)
On September 9, 2013, almost one year after revoking Martin's probation,
the court entered a corrected revocation order to add language clarifying that
Martin's sentences are consecutive.

(Compare R., pp.14-15 ("2013 Corrected

Order") with 2012 Order.) Both orders stated Martin would receive credit for 718
days.

(R., p.15; 2012 Order, p.2.)

Four months later, on January 10, 2014,

Martin fled a prose motion asking the district court to "correct" its 2013 Corrected
Order to indicate that the 718 days credit for time served should apply to both of
his sentences, and to "reflect that the 'fixed' portion of Count II has already been
served."

(R., pp.17-18 ("2014 Motion").)

Martin contended that the 2013

Corrected Order needed to be modified in order for the Department of Correction
to grant him credit for time served on Count II.

(R., p.18.)

The district court

denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it did not have "jurisdiction in [Martin's]

2

criminal case to grant the relief requested" and directing Martin to "file a

of

habeas corpus pursuant to I.C. § 19-4205." (R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal
order. (See R., pp.6-7 (register of actions reflecting no notice of appeal filed after
the court denied Martin's motion on February 10, 2014).)
Eleven months later, on January 15, 2015, Martin filed a second motion
for credit for time served pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c). (R., pp.51-52 ("2015 Motion").)
In his 2015 Motion, Martin requested an order correcting the credit for time
served to reflect a parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, and to "acknowledge"
he is entitled to credit for time served on both counts, as stated in the Sentence
Clarification entered on June 16, 2010. (R., p.52.) Martin's request was based
on the state's calculation of credit for time served and parole eligibility, which the
state provided in response to Martin's 2014 Motion.

(R., pp.52, 55-57.)

On

February 27, 2015, the district court denied Martin's motion, stating:
The Defendant has not presented any additional information
that the court's calculation was incorrect under either Idaho Code
§§ 18-309 or 19-2603. The Defendant is asking in this motion that
the District Court order the Idaho Department of Corrections to
calculate his time differently.
The Court has no jurisdiction in this criminal case to grant
the relief requested in this motion. Any writ of habeas corpus must
be filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4205.
Therefore, the
Defendant's Motion for Correction of Miscalculated Sentence ICR
35 subsection (c) is hereby DISMISSED.
(R., pp.69-70.)
Martin filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court's February
27, 2015 order denying his 2015 Motion. (R., pp.71-75.)
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ISSUE
Martin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Martin's ICR 35(c)
motion for correction of his sentence to accurately reflect credit for
time served?
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Is Martin's challenge to his 2015 Motion barred by the doctrine of res
judicata? Alternatively, has Martin failed to show the district court erred in
denying the relief he requested in his 2015 Motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Res Judicata Bars Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion; Alternatively, Martin
Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion
A.

Introduction
Martin asserts the district court erred in denying his 2015 Motion and

claims the court's 2013 Corrected Order fails to properly give him credit for time
served as evidenced by the Department of Correction's miscalculation of his
parole eligibility date. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Martin further asserts the district
court was required to remedy this alleged error pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.)

Because Martin's 2015 Motion is an attempt to

relitigate the same issue presented in relation to his 2014 Motion, this Court
should find consideration of the 2015 Motion is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Alternatively, Martin has failed to show error in the denial of his 2015
Motion because he has failed to demonstrate that the district court's 2013
Corrected Order was erroneous or that the district court erred in concluding it did
not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to direct the Department of
Correction to recalculate Martin's parole eligibility date.

8.

Standard Of Review
"Questions of jurisdiction are questions of law over which this Court has

free review," State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.3d 979, 981 (2010)
(citation omitted), as is the "question of whether an action is barred by res
judicata," State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000)
(citation omitted).

"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly

5

awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is [also] a question
of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasguez,
142 Idaho 67, 68,122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116
Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial
court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly
erroneous." State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P .3d 771, 772 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App.
2003)).

C.

Martin's 2015 Motion Challenging His Credit For Time Served Is Barred
By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata
"As a general matter, the doctrine of res judicata holds that in an action

between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former
adjudication concludes parties and privies as to every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim." Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at
482 (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted). In Rhoades, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that "the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration of
subsequent Rule 35 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate
issues already finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions."

kl

Martin's 2015

Motion, from which he now appeals, is barred by res judicata because it is an
effort to relitigate the same Rule 35 claim he previously asserted in his 2014
Motion.

6

Martin filed his first motion for credit for time served on January 10, 201
(R., pp.17-18.) In his 2014 Motion, Martin asserted, in relevant part:

The Corrected Judgment entered on September 9th, 2013,
does not reflect that the credit is to be taken from each of the two
sentences.
The Corrected [J]udgment does not reflect that the "fixed"
portion of Count II has already been served.
Because the wording of the Corrected Judgment entered on
September 9th, 2013 does not reflect what was ordered by Judge
Wetherell when he imposed the sentence upon the Petitioner, it has
caused the Department of Corrections to not grant to the Petitioner
the 718 days credit for time served against Count II.
(R., p.18.) Martin also complained: "The time calculation of the Department of

Corrections still has me serving a five year period of time" on Count II. (R., p.19.)
The state filed a written response to Martin's 2014 Motion in which it set
forth its belief that Martin was entitled to 728 days credit for time served, rather
than the 718 days set forth in the court's 2013 Corrected Order, and submitted:
. . . the Defendant's sentence is 10 years, with 6 fixed and 4
indeterminate on count I, followed by 5 years, with 1 fixed and 4
indeterminate on count II. On Count I, Defendant should be
granted credit for 481 days served pretrial, 172 days served on his
rider and 75 days served on the probation violation for a total of 728
days. On Count II, Defendant is entitled to credit for 481 days
served in pretrial incarceration. The State has no objection to the
Court correcting the sentence in this matter to reflect the credit as
set forth herein. Based on the State's calculations, Defendant's
overall sentence, 15 years with 7 fixed (2557 days) and 8 years
(2922 days) indeterminate, should be set off by 1209 total days of
credit for time served. Therefore, as of the time of the Court's order
revoking probation, Defendant had 1348 days to serve before he
was parole eligible.
His parole eligibility date would be
approximately April 15, 2016.

7

(R., p.28.)2

The district court denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it lacked
jurisdiction in Martin's "criminal case to grant the relief requested in [his] motion."
(R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal that decision.

On January 15, 2015, Martin filed his second motion for credit for time
served, asking the court to "correct" its "time calculation" to reflect a parole
eligibility date of April 15, 2016. (R., pp.51-52.) Thus, in his 2015 Motion, Martin
sought to relitigate the "matter offered and received" in relation to his 2014
Motion.

Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482.

This is apparent given

Martin's reliance on the state's response to his 2014 Motion as a basis for relief.
(R., pp.51-52, 55-57.)

While the language Martin used in his 2015 Motion

focused on his parole eligibility date as calculated by the state in its 2014 written
response, rather than the Department of Correction's alleged failure to give him
credit for time served on Count 11, the ultimate purpose of the motion was the
same.

The facts in Rhoades are instructive on why res judicata precludes

consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion.
After a jury found Rhoades guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the district
court sentenced Rhoades to death "for the murder and kidnapping charges, and
a fixed life term for the robbery charge," but stated that "in the event the death

2

The April 15, 2016 parole eligibility date suggested by the state in response to
Martin's 2014 Motion is incorrect because it gives Martin 481 days credit for time
served on the fixed portion of Count II even though the fixed term for that count is
only 365 days. (R., p.70.) It is also based on 10 additional days credit for time
served post-judgment, which are not included in the district court's calculation of
718 days. (R., pp.69-70.)
8

sentences were commuted to life in prison or any other sentence, they would be
enhanced by a fixed consecutive term of 15 years for the use of a firearm."
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 862, 11 P.3d at 481.

"Following the imposition of

sentence, Rhoades filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence seeking a
correction of the sentence 'heretofore given by providing only one sentence for
weapons enhancement per the entire transaction."' ~ at 862-863, 11 P.3d at
481-482.

The district court denied Rhoades' Rule 35 motion and Rhoades

appealed, but he only challenged his convictions, not the denial of his request for
Rule 35 relief.

&

at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. Several years after the Idaho Supreme

Court affirmed Rhoades' convictions, sentences, and the denial of postconviction relief, Rhoades filed a second Rule 35 motion "asking the court 'to
correct the illegal firearms enhancements imposed in [his] case."'

&

The district

court denied Rhoades' motion and Rhoades appealed.
On appeal, in response to the state's res judicata argument, Rhoades
asserted the doctrine did not apply because, he claimed, the issue he sought to
relitigate in his second Rule 35 motion was "not the same issue litigated earlier."
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument as "without merit," explaining:
In his first Rule 35 motion, Rhoades moved "to correct the sentence
heretofore given by providing only one sentence for weapons
enhancement per the entire transaction .... " Clearly, Rhoades was
arguing he should have been given only one sentence
enhancement for the entire course of events, rather than the three
separate enhancements given by the trial judge. Similarly, in his
current motion, Rhoades argues his sentence is illegal because he
was given three separate sentence enhancements for conduct
which constituted a single, indivisible course of conduct. While the
two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they

9

nevertheless encompass the same issue; namely, whether the
district judge erred in giving Rhoades a separate sentence
enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted, rather
than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of
conduct. Thus, Rhoades is now seeking to relitigate the same
issue already decided by the district judge and not appealed by
Rhoades. Therefore, because consideration of the present motion
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the order of the
district judge denying Rhoades' Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal
sentence, albeit on different grounds than those used by the district
judge.
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (ellipses original).
As in Rhoades, consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because it is an attempt to relitigate the same issue finally
decided in his 2014 Motion. 3

0.

Even If Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion Is Not Barred By Res
Judicata, He Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The
Motion
Even if this Court concludes consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is not

barred by res judicata, Martin has failed to show the district court erred in
denying the motion.

Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) authorizes a district court to

correct its "computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 18-309 or 19-2603" at "any time." On appeal, Martin argues the "district
3

Also as in Rhoades, this Court may affirm based on res judicata even though
the district court did not expressly deny Martin's 2015 Motion on this basis.
Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (affirming denial of Rule 35 motion
based on res judicata even though district court denied motion on merits); see
also State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citing State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984))
("Where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though based upon an incorrect
reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory.")). The district
court did, however, note that it previously considered a similar motion and that
Martin had not "presented any additional information that the court's calculation
was incorrect." (R., p.69.)
10

court's corrected order and sentence does not give him full credit for the
prejudgment time served on both courts [sic].

The fact that !DOC does not

believe he is parole eligible until 2017 is proof of the error in the court's order and
sentence."

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

"The fact" that Martin believes the

Department of Correction has miscalculated his parole eligibility date does not,
however, mean the district court's 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous or that the
district court erred in denying Martin's 2015 Motion. The court's 2013 Corrected
Order is silent on whether the amount of credit authorized applies to one or both
of Martin's sentences; the order only provides that Martin should be given 718
days 4 credit for time served, "which includes time spent on the retained
jurisdiction program." (R., p.15.) Although the order does not affirmatively state
how the credit for time served should be allocated, Martin cites no legal authority

The state notes there is a 10-day difference between the 718 days awarded in
the court's 2013 Corrected Order (R., p.15), which is also reflected in the
Department of Correction's Time Calculation Report (Appendix A), and the 728
days the state relied on its response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which also formed
the basis for its suggested parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, that Martin
claims is correct (R., p.57; Appellant's Brief, p.7). Martin, however, does not
directly challenge the 10-day difference or offer any argument or authority
explaining why the district court's date calculation is incorrect. (See generally
Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Martin also does not directly challenge, or offer any
argument or authority, to support a claim that the Department of Correction's
August parole eligibility date is incorrect as compared to his requested April
parole eligibility date, which cannot be explained by the 10-day difference in
credit for time served. (Id.) Rather, Martin's complaints on appeal center on his
assertion that the 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous because it "does not give
him full credit for the prejudgment time served on both courts [sic]." (Appellant's
Brief, p.6.) Martin has, therefore, waived any such challenge to the district
court's 718-day calculation or the August parole eligibility date. See Murray v.
State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be
considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to consider
appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or legal
proposition to support his argument").
4
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the proposition that it is required to do so.

Martin's claim that the district

court's 2013 Corrected Order "was written so that he only received credit for
prejudgment time served on one of the two counts" is without merit. (Appellant's
Brief, p.6.)
Martin's complaints about the district court's 2013 Corrected Order also
ignore the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation Report he
attached to his 2015 Motion. (R., p.67 (Appendix A 5).) As noted by the district
court, that document "show[s] IDOC credits the defendant with 559 days for jail
and 158 days for I DOC on each offense. This totals credit for time served for
pretrial and probation violation credit for 718 days credited on each offense

toward the fixed time." (R., p.69 (emphasis added); see Appendix A.) The
record, therefore, contradicts Martin's claim that the district court's 2013
Corrected Order has prevented the Department of Correction from giving him
credit for time served on both counts.

In fact, it appears 718 days credit has

been attributed to both counts even though Martin is not entitled to full credit on
both. 6 While the district court, in its Sentence Clarification, awarded Martin credit

5

Attached hereto as Appendix A is the Idaho Department of Correction Official
Time Calculation Report that appears in the record at page 67.
6

The state acknowledges that, based on the Time Calculation Report (Appendix
A), there appears to be a disparity between the number of days the Department
of Correction has credited to Count II and the parole eligibility date it has
calculated for Count II; however, that apparent disparity only reinforces the
state's position, discussed infra, that Martin must pursue the relief he seeks by
filing a habeas petition under I.C. § 19-4205, so that the disparity may be
explored in an action to which the Department is a party.

12

for prejudgment time served on both counts, 7 Martin is not legally entitled to
credit on both counts for time served after judgment was entered. 8 Indeed, that
was not the state's position in its written response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which
Martin adopted in support of his 2015 Motion.

(R., p.57.)

Nor does Martin

appear to believe otherwise on appeal as indicated by his assertion that his
"proper parole eligibility date" is "approximately April 15, 2016," "as set out in the
State's response to his original motion." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Because the
record shows that the Department of Correction appears to have given Martin
more credit than he is due on Count 11, and nothing in the district court's 2013
Corrected Order has prevented Martin from getting more credit than he is due,
Martin's only viable argument is that the Department of Correction has

The district court's award of credit for prejudgment time served on both counts
was not consistent with the law as set forth in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352,
630 P.3d 143, 144 (1981 ), in which the Court held a defendant could not receive
prejudgment credit for time served for each separate crime. The Idaho Supreme
Court recently overruled Hoch in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30
(2015), but concluded its "new interpretation of Idaho Code section 18-309's
plain language only prospectively and to cases now on direct review."
Nevertheless, the state is not seeking affirmative relief on the misapplication of
credit for time served prejudgment.
7

"[P]eriods of post-judgment incarceration," including "time spent in the retained
jurisdiction program," "must be credited to the sentence." State v. Albertson, 135
Idaho 723, 725, 23 P.3d 797, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Similarly,
"if a defendant was arrested for probation violations and spent time in
confinement awaiting the disposition of the alleged violations, that incarceration
must be credited against the underlying sentence .... " 1st (citing I.C. § 19-2603,
other citations omitted). Unlike I.C. § 18-309, which authorizes prejudgment
credit on "the offense," without limitation, Owens, 158 Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at
33, I.C. § 19-2603 only allows for credit on the defendant's sentence. Martin's
"sentence" is for an overall term of 15 years with seven fixed; he is not entitled to
double credit for time served on that sentence post-judgment. Nothing in the
decisional law of this state or the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 provides
otherwise and Martin does not appear to contend otherwise. (See Appellant's
Brief, p.7.)
8
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miscalculated his parole eligibility date. On this point, the district court correctly
concluded it did not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to "grant the relief
requested." (R., p.70.)
Idaho Code Section 19-4205(2)(c) provides that a prisoner may file an
application for writ of habeas corpus to address "[m]iscalculation of his
sentence." It is clear that I.C. §19-4205 is the proper mechanism for suing the
Department of Correction if Martin believes the Department has calculated his
parole eligibility date incorrectly.

See Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 139

P.3d 773 (2006). 9 It is equally clear that I.C.R. 35(c), which only allows the court
to determine the amount of credit for time served due to a defendant, is not the
proper mechanism for requiring the Department of Correction to recalculate a
parole eligibility date.

See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143

(2009) (district court jurisdiction under I.C.R. 35 limited by scope of relief
authorized by the rule). As such, Martin has failed to show any error in the denial
of his 2015 Motion.

Initiating the cause of action authorized by I.C. § 19-4205 is necessary for the
district court to obtain jurisdiction over the Department of Correction and order it
to perform whatever act the court deems appropriate. Indeed, in his 2014
Motion, the only case Martin cited was Fullmer, supra. (R., p.19 (citing Fullmer,
143 Idaho 171, 139 P.3d 773).) The district court twice instructed Martin to
pursue relief under I.C. § 19-4205 (R., pp.50, 70), and it is unclear why Martin
has refused to take this course of action.
9
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Martin's request for
relief pursuant to !.C.R. 35(c).
DATED this 23 rd day of November, 2015.

JE~Sl¢A M. LORELLO
De~ Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 rd day of November, 2015, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP
303 W. Bannock
P. 0. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
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JESSIQA M. LORELLO
Deputy' Attorney General
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SEX: M STATUS: Termer
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CASE NUMBERS
SENTENCE NUMBER

CR09-4937
5

CR09-4937

COUNTY

ELMORE

ELMORE

CRIME
COUNTS(IDENTICAL TERMS)

DRIV INFLNCE

ACCIDENT LV
1

DATE OF CRIME

1
05,06.07

05,06.07

MINIMUM SENTENCE

6- 0-

0

SENTENCE

10- 0-

0

MAXIMUM

DATE OF SENTENCE

EFFECTIVE DATE
cc/cs TO SENTENCE
CONSECUTIVE BEGIN DATE
INDETERMINATE BEGIN DATE

6

1- 05- 0-

0
0

08/06/2012

08/06/2012

I

cs
5
08/18/2016

08/18/2017

08/18/2021

559

559

159

159

08/18/2016.
08/17/2021

08/18/2017
08/17/2025

SENTENCE

JURISDICTION BEGINS
JURISDICTION ENDS
JURISDICTION QUASHED
JAIL CREDITS
IDOC CREDITS
tPAROLE ELIGIBLE

FULL TERM EXPIRATION

-------·------------------------------------------------------------------CC= Concurrent, CS= Consecutive, CL= Consecutive to All
------------------------------------------------------------------------

REMARKS:
GENERAL

08,08.12AG*/08,08,12 J-AUDIT.BP

STATUS PERIODS:
START
LENGTH TYPE
11/01/2012
08/06/2012
11/03/2010
06/24/2010
05/28/2010

398 Present at Facility
87 SENTENCE DATE
642 RELEASED FROM FACILITY
132 Present at Facility
27 S'ENTENCE DATE
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